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Sammendrag 
Det er flere grunner til at et lands ambisjoner om utslippskutt gjennom utslippsprising fremover kan ha 
manglende troverdighet i befolkningen. Dersom avgiftssystemer eller kvotehandelssystemer ikke 
forventes å bli opprettholdt særlig lenge vil de ikke utløse investeringer i klimateknologier, selv om 
disse fra et samfunnsøkonomisk ståsted er kostnadseffektive tiltak. I dette arbeidet sammenligner vi 
velferdskostnadene ved norske klimapolitiske ambisjoner i tre virkemiddelscenarioer; ett med bare 
utslippsprising i et kvotehandelssystem, ett der kvotehandelen kombineres med en garantiordning som 
legger risikoen for svakere regulering i fremtiden på myndighetenes skuldre, og ett der et 
subsidieringsprogram for teknologiinvesteringer supplerer kvotesystemet. Vi bruker en teknologi-rik 
numerisk likevektsmodell som modellerer både velkjente og hittil ikke implementerte teknologier.  
 
Resultatene våre tyder på at en garantiordning som sikrer langsiktig troverdighet vil kunne redusere 
kostnadene til 1/3 sammenlignet med å innføre bare et kvotehandelssystem, fordi sistnevnte ikke er i 
stand til å utløse samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomme teknologiinvesteringer. Subsidiering er et mer kjent 
virkemiddel for å stimulere til klimavennlige investeringer. Vi finner at de samfunnsøkonomiske 
finansieringskostnadene for et slikt system er små, slik at kostnadene ikke blir vesentlig høyere enn for 
en garantiordning. Det er imidlertid en utfordring for myndighetene å plukke ut de mest lønnsomme 
investeringsprosjektene. Beregningene vi har gjort kan også belyse hvor viktig det er å bruke en 
teknologi-rik likevektsmodell. I tradisjonelle numeriske likevektsmodeller vil kostnadene ved å 
gjennomføre en best mulig politikk bli sterkt overvurdert – i vårt studerte tilfelle med en faktor 3. 
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1 Introduction 
Several jurisdictions have announced unilateral climate policy ambitions for the coming decades. The 
cost of imposing a domestic cap will heavily depend on whether the domestic policy design generates 
the most cost-effective projects within the respective jurisdictions. Even though the usual 
recommendation for optimal abatement is uniform emissions pricing, market failures or other 
inefficiencies may render emissions pricing insufficient. This study addresses one such case that may 
arise if policymakers prove unable to credibly commit to future policy. Several socially cost-effective 
abatement options involve upfront investment, and these may be hampered if politicians fail to 
determine future policies and instead leave it up to future politicians to do so. Indeed, even if the same 
politicians remain in office, there is an inherent time inconsistency problem in their behaviour that 
tends to discourage investments. If agents take on immediate investment costs in response to 
announced future ambitions and emission prices, future prices need only to encourage operational 
costs in the future and can be set lower than earlier announced. On the other hand, if agents do not 
invest today, future abatement costs will be substantially larger than assumed by current policymakers, 
and optimal ambitions will fall; see Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1992). Whether the source of 
commitment failures in climate policy is time inconsistency or the inability of politicians to commit 
their successors, the phenomenon may impede the diffusion of available climate technologies (Ulph 
and Ulph, 2013: Brunner et al., 2012).  
 
Quantification of the potential inefficiencies of such regulatory uncertainty is scarce in the literature. 
The main purpose of this study is to compare the costs of mitigating national greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions under different policy designs, given that upfront investment in climate technologies is 
hampered by the inability of policymakers to signal trustworthy ambitions. When emissions pricing is 
perceived as short-lived, upfront investment in climate technologies will not appear profitable; firms 
will instead reduce their variable costs and scale down output, while consumers will respond by 
substituting other consumer goods for energy, and leisure for consumption (Spiller, 1996). We 
numerically analyse the consequences in terms of abatement costs and lack of technological change 
and evaluate alternative policy responses to such regulatory uncertainty, including a guarantee scheme 
and an upfront investment subsidy scheme.  
 
Bosetti and Victor (2011) numerically study commitment problems of a global emissions pricing 
system and assume the view of economic agents in powerful states, which differs from our perspective 
of a small, ambitious country. They argue that, due to the lack of supranational legal institutions, 
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problems with confidence in international agreements may be even more serious than problems with 
confidence in actions/decisions that are actually taken by large states. For small states, however, 
unilateral ambitions imply taking on extra costs without reaping obvious climate gains. This could 
easily become more politically controversial, less reliable and, thus, more costly than taking part in a 
binding international agreement. Furthermore, it is often the case that the smaller the coalition, the 
smaller the variety of emission sources and, consequently, the more expensive the abatement. 
Countries showing a willingness to act are also likely to have tried out the cheaper options already.  
 
Numerically assessing mitigation strategies and abatement costs under various policy regimes requires 
a computational model that allows for abatement both within and beyond existing technologies. For 
this purpose, we developed a CGE model which, besides including options of downscaling emission-
intensive activities and substituting factors within existing technologies, accounts for potential 
endogenous changes in climate technologies (Fæhn et al., 2013). This is in contrast to conventional 
CGE models which lack technological responsiveness beyond historically observed practice and thus 
tend to overestimate abatement costs. On the other hand, like traditional energy system models, 
technology-rich models exclude realistic flexibility of economies that stems from existing, profitable 
downscaling options both in supply and demand and from cost-shifting opportunities among market 
agents. Our modelling solution differs from the bulk of recent years’ development of large-scale 
hybrid approaches, as in Bataille et al. (2009), Bosetti et al. (2006), and Laitner and Hanson (2006) by 
being simple and easily applicable while at the same time being capable of representing, with good 
approximation, a variety of potential technological options. We expand the scope compared to other 
contributions in the field by not limiting the technological adaptation possibilities to the energy supply 
side alone and instead allowing for investment in climate technologies within energy-intensive sectors. 
Energy-intensive manufacturing industries have several technological options, as have many 
households, firms, and public service sectors when it comes to, for example, transportation 
technologies.  
 
Our analysis considers Norway’s ambitious domestic target, representing an approximate 20-per-cent 
cut in GHG emissions in 2020 from a business-as-usual (BAU) Reference Scenario (Climate Cure 
2020, 2010a). We find that the most cost-effective commitment device – a guarantee scheme that 
ensures long-lasting commitment to a uniform emissions pricing scheme – implies an economy-wide 
welfare loss of ¼ per cent, or about EUR 25 per capita as a yearly average. In this cost-effective 
regime, more than half of the necessary reduction is achieved by choosing more climate-friendly 
technological solutions. The rest is obtained by scaling down relatively emission-intensive industries 
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and consumption activities. In other words, abatement at this ambitious level is not overwhelmingly 
costly. However, failure to implement a reliable, enduring climate policy more than triples the 
abatement costs compared to the scenario with the guarantee scheme. When technology options are 
ruled out, the main extra costs fall on traditional manufacturing firms that shut down production, 
typically in areas with few alternative job opportunities. Subsidising upfront investment in climate 
technologies is a feasible policy option. The marginal cost of raising funds is found to be minor. 
Finally, note that the case where technological options are ruled out also serves to illustrate the 
outcome of a traditional CGE analysis. Our findings indicate that traditional CGE models significantly 
overestimate the costs of the first-best policy – in our case by a factor of 3.  
 
The hybrid model is presented in section 2, while the design of the analysis and the main assumptions 
in the simulated scenarios are presented in section 3. Section 4 reports from the analysis, while section 
5 concludes and discusses some contributions and caveats. 
2 The model 
2.1 General 
MSG-TECH, a CGE-based hybrid model of the Norwegian economy, is a recursively dynamic, 
integrated economy-energy-emission model with endogenous climate technology options.
1
 It specifies 
60 commodities and 40 industries. Real capital and labour are perfectly mobile within the economy, 
while financial capital is perfectly mobile across borders. As the economy is small, all agents face 
exogenous world market prices and interest rates (the exchange rate is numeraire). The model gives a 
detailed description of the empirical tax, production, and final consumption structures. Several second-
best features due to market imperfections or policy interventions are modelled, including taxation of 
labour and existing industrial policies. In addition, barriers to climate technology investment can be 
represented.  
2.2 Behaviour  
Consumers are represented by a single average consumer whose utility in every period depends on the 
consumption of leisure and of 26 different consumer goods organised in a CES structure; see Figure 
A.1 in the appendix. Environmental benefits are not accounted for. Consumer goods are specified at a 
                                                     
1 The model is a recursively dynamic version of MSG-6; see Heide et al. (2004) and Bye (2008), enriched with technology 
options. 
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detailed level with a view to capturing important substitution possibilities. Energy goods such as 
transport fuel, heating oil, and electricity are specified, and different forms of commercial transport, 
either polluting or environmentally benign, can replace own car use in households and industries. Own 
car use can also avoid GHG emissions by investing in new vehicle types with alternative technologies. 
The modelling of these choices is explained in section 2.3. Consumer welfare is defined as the present 
value of utility received from consumption and leisure.  
 
Firms in each industry maximise the current value of their cash flow by setting production levels and 
the composition of factor inputs subject to exogenous expected capital prices. Factors include labour, 
different types of capital, a variety of goods, services, and energy goods, among them fossil fuels – see 
Figure A.1. As for households, firms may also choose to invest in vehicle types with different 
emission intensities. Firms may also invest in other types of climate technologies; see section 2.3. 
Each firm within an industry produces its own unique product variety; this implies a certain degree of 
market power in separate domestic market niches. A wider range of varieties increases utility and 
productivity of the goods (love of variety); see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). External effects on 
productivity from environmental change are not modelled. 
 
The model provides a detailed description of electricity supply that distinguishes between hydropower 
production, natural gas power production, transmission, and distribution. Gas power producers can 
invest in carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. Norway’s international power trade in the 
Nordic market is modelled. Due to policy and resource restrictions, the following activities are 
exogenously determined in our simulations: production of public goods and services, extraction of oil 
and gas, power generation, and output from agriculture, forestry, and fishery.  
 
Norwegian firms compete with foreign suppliers in domestic markets and abroad. According to the 
Armington hypothesis, import shares depend negatively on the ratio of the import price to the price of 
domestic deliveries. The markets for domestic and exported deliveries are segregated by means of a 
constant elasticity-of-transformation function, allowing prices of domestic deliveries to develop 
differently from the exogenous export prices.  
2.3 Technology adaptations  
The distinct feature of the MSG-TECH model is that households, firms, and public institutions can 
choose to invest in completely new technologies with lower emission intensities. This applies to 
Process industries and Petroleum extraction as well as to the own land transport activities of firms, 
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households, and the public sector. Along with households, the service industries Commercial road 
transportation and Other private servicing are the largest users of own land transport.
2
 By adding 
realistic emission reduction possibilities to the model through technology investments and their 
associated economic costs, agents will have a wider range of possibilities than traditional CGE models 
allow for.  
 
The method resembles the classical engineering approach to economic production functions (Chenery, 
1949 and Sav, 1984): i.e., in the absence of statistical data on the abatement functions, we use 
engineering information directly. There are reasons to believe that abatement costs differ considerably 
between firms, industries, countries, and contexts, and over time. Our data are based on sector-specific 
current knowledge and primarily on Norwegian studies, which should give a good representation of 
costs. However, we acknowledge that learning potential and technological development are difficult to 
predict, even within the relatively short time span assumed by our sources and simulations. As the 
Norwegian market is small, we model learning and technological development as unaffected by 
investments by domestic firms and households. The modelling, data, and estimations are accounted for 
below. See Fæhn et al. (2013) for more details.  
A stylised representation of technology adaptations
3
 
Before introducing technology adaptations in the model, representative profit-maximising firms have 
the following stylised production functions:  
(1) 

 







0
V
X ,  
whereX is output, V factor input, ε0 is exogenous factor productivity and the scale elasticity pa-
rameter (0 <ρ <1). The profit,  for the representative firm in the presence of an emission tax is: 
(2)   XXPXB V  0
/1
0 

,  
where B is the output price, P
V
 the input price, and μ0 the exogenous emission intensity of the firm. 
The first order condition renders: 
                                                     
2 See Table A.1 in the appendix for a list of model industries. 
3 The most important simplifications made here is to aggregate inputs and assume that emissions are linked to the output 
level. See section 2.4 for more details. This simplified presentation is less representative for our modelling of land transport, 
where we link emissions to the use of fuels and add abatement costs to the price of (imported) vehicles. 
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
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
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V
.  
In our modelling of the effects of endogenous abatement technology adaptations, we insert an addi-
tional module that accounts for additional costs in terms of investment, operation, and maintenance 
and for benefits in terms of reduced unit emissions. We do this by introducing two endogenous param-
eters  and  that allow for changes in factor productivity and emission efficiency, respectively:  
(4)  


/10 X
E
  
(5)  
X
D
 0   
The endogenous  parameter accounts for the abatement cost of the firm, E, by adding its effect to the 
initial factor productivity level, . The interpretation is that the input use needed for a given output 
increases when technological adaptation takes place; i.e., factor productivity decreases and ε>0. Quite 
similarly,  accounts for endogenous unit abatement through technological adaptations, D /X. As long 
as technological abatement takes place, μ<. 
 
The rest of the inserted technology module determines E and D. First, technological opportunities are 
represented by marginal abatement costs, c, as a function of abatement through technological adapta-
tions, D:  
(6)  )(Dfc   
In a cost-efficient solution, firms will invest in abatement technology until the marginal abatement 
cost equals the marginal cost of emitting: 
(7)  c   
Next, we define the total technological abatement costs, E, as the integral of marginal abatement costs 
in equation (6):  
(8)  
  dDDfE .  
Note that as long as 0 , c, D, and E are all zero, and the solution for  andwill be 0  and 
0  as in the original model without abatement technologies. If 00  , then 0  and 0 . 
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The three next sections describe the data and estimations as well as further modelling details that apply 
to specific industries. 
Process industries 
We estimate the costs for the following industrial processes: cement production (in Manufacture of 
chemical and mineral products; see Table A.1); production of chemical commodities (in Manufacture 
of industrial chemicals); production of aluminium, iron, steel, and ferroalloys (in Manufacture of 
metals); and oil refining (in Petroleum refining). The technological adaptations investigated include 
case-specific ways of converting to bioenergy, of process optimisation, and of sequestration of GHG 
emissions, including CCS.
4
 We arrange the measures by cost annuities and estimate a marginal 
abatement cost curve that links marginal costs to accumulated abatement potentials. We choose 
estimates based on their combined performance on fit as well as on reasonable extrapolations in both 
ends. In other words, we want to ensure that abatement costs for small potentials never fall below zero 
and that marginal abatement costs always increase with accumulated abatement. Figure 1 depicts the 
outcome of the estimation procedure for Process industries as a whole. The curve shows an R
2 
of 0.85. 
The curve is fairly linear in the relevant area, also for large, extrapolated abatement levels. The most 
expensive measures are CCS-based, and it is reasonable to expect potentials for this technology in 
plants smaller than those included in the data set, though at rising marginal costs due to significant 
economies of scale.   
                                                     
4 The following sources of costs and potentials are used: SFT (2007), SINTEF (2009), TELTEK (2009) and Climate Cure 
2020 (2010a). 
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Figure 1: Marginal abatement cost curve, Process industries. EUR/tonne CO2e  
 
Land transport 
The variety of quantified measures for reducing emissions from Norwegian land transport includes 
efficiency improvement of passenger cars and commercial vehicles, private and public zero-emission 
vehicles, and fuel intermixture of ethanol and biodiesel, as well as measures to coordinate land 
planning. Our sources assess uncertainty as well as sensitivity to costs and potentials for the sequence 
in which the measures are phased in.
5
 We pick the medium estimates, and the cheapest measures are 
assumed to be introduced first. As shown in Figure 2, the estimated marginal cost curve for land 
transport fits very well to the data, with an R
2
 of 0.98. When extrapolating upwards, the marginal costs 
increase sharply. Because there are limits to efficiency improvements and bio-blending potentials, this 
slope can be reasonable unless a breakthrough in battery and hydrogen technology is imminent.  
                                                     
5 See SFT (2007) and Kanenergi/INSA (2009). 
Marginal abatement costs (annuity)  EUR/tonne CO
2
e  
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Figure 2: Marginal abatement cost curve, Land transport. EUR/tonne CO2e 
  
Petroleum extraction 
Measures for the petroleum extraction sector were quantified by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD, 2010). They include various forms of alternative power supply to the offshore sector 
(electrification from land, offshore wind power), power efficiency improvements, and CCS. Figure 3 
presents the outcome of the estimation. The curve is fairly steep for large abatement volumes, 
reflecting the fact that measures within petroleum extraction rely to a large extent on individual 
solutions coming from each area, which proves costly. R
2 
of 0.93 indicates a very good fit to data. 
Marginal abatement costs (annuity) EUR/tonne CO
2
e 
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Figure 3: Marginal abatement cost curve, Petroleum extraction. EUR/tonne CO2e 
  
2.4 Emissions and climate policy instruments 
The production and consumption activities in the model are linked to coefficients for emissions to air 
in accordance with the emissions inventory developed by Statistics Norway. Emission-generating 
activities include intermediate goods, energy goods, consumption activities, production processes, and 
waste disposal sites. Emission compounds include the six GHGs in the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the fluorine compounds SF6, CFC, and HFC. The 
emissions are all measured in CO2 equivalents (CO2e) according to their global warming potential. In 
addition, emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), non-
methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs), ammonia (NH3), and particulate matter (PMx) are 
modelled.  
 
This is a relatively detailed modelling of climate policy instruments, allowing for differentiated and 
uniform GHG taxes, national and international allowance trading systems, free allowances, and 
investment subsidies for climate technologies. It is assumed that the authorities’ budget balances are 
always maintained. In the version of the model used here, this is accomplished by adjusting 
employers’ payroll taxes.  
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3 Design of the analysis and main assumptions 
Section 4 analyses and compares three different policy strategies, all aimed at fulfilling the same 
ambitions for 2020, exemplified by the agreed climate ambitions of the Norwegian parliament. These 
include continued participation in the European emissions trading system (EU ETS), contributions to 
global abatement, and a cap on emissions from the domestic territory, representing a 20-per-cent cut in 
GHG emissions from BAU.  
 
The three scenarios differ with respect to how the domestic cap is met. In all scenarios a uniform 
emission price is imposed on all Norwegian GHG sources. The difference between Scenarios I and II 
is that the government succeeds in committing to the future policy in Scenario I, while the policy lacks 
confidence in Scenario II. In Scenario III, commitment to a long-lasting emission price is not ensured, 
but the emissions pricing scheme is supplemented by subsidies for upfront investments as a second-
best approach to encouraging technological adaptations.  
3.1 The Reference Scenario 
Besides important drivers like demographic development, natural resource forecasts, and technological 
change, domestic emissions in the Reference Scenario follow from BAU policy assumptions.
6
 For 
climate policy, BAU implies, inter alia, that the Norwegian differentiated system of CO2 taxes in 2004 
is included and prolonged at real levels.
7
 The 2004 rates vary between EUR 0 and EUR 50 per tonne, 
with petrol and emissions from offshore extraction of oil and gas at the highest rates; see Table 1.  
 
Norway’s association with the EU ETS from 2008 is included in the Reference Scenario, and the 
previous tax system for the quota-regulated industries is simultaneously removed.
8
 For the period 
2008‒2012 the EU ETS participation implies that Petroleum extraction, Process industries (except 
most of Manufacture of metals), Petroleum refining, and Generation of electricity are quota-regulated, 
embracing about 40 per cent of Norwegian climate gas emissions (in 2005). From 2013, Manufacture 
of metals is fully included, which increases the quota-regulated share to 50 per cent. The majority of 
the EU ETS allowances are allocated free of charge. Their value is modelled as a lump-sum subsidy, 
since they rely on historical emissions. Besides commitments under the EU ETS, Norway has 
commitments under the global Kyoto agreements. To meet those, we assume that the government 
                                                     
6 See Fæhn et al. (2013) for details. The assumptions are based on Climate Cure 2020 (2010a), the report of an officially 
appointed commission tasked with preparing the ground for evaluating Norway’s climate policy.  
7 Note that in the BAU scenario the existing CO2 tax system, which has been in place since 1991, is assumed to maintain its 
confidence in the years to come.  
8 The exception is North Sea petroleum extraction, which is subject to both quota pricing and tax rates. 
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supplements the EU ETS instruments and its domestic policies with the use of flexible mechanisms 
until 2020. The projected development in the price of EU ETS allowances and flexible mechanisms is 
shown in Figure 4.
9
 Both are assumedly determined abroad, independent of domestic actions.  
Table 1: CO2 tax rates in the Reference Scenario. EUR/tonne (2004 prices)  
 Rate 
Maximum taxes by fuels  
- Gasoline 50 
- Coal for energy purposes 24 
- Auto diesel and light fuel oils  22 
- Heavy fuel oils 19 
- Coke for energy purposes 18 
Taxes by sectors and fuels  
North Sea petroleum extraction  
- Oil for burning 42 
- Natural gas for burning 48 
Pulp and paper industry, herring flour industry 10 
Ferroalloys, carbide, and aluminium industries, production of cement and LECA, air transport, foreign 
carriage, fishing and catching by sea, domestic fishing, and goods traffic by sea 
     0 
Source: Statistics Norway 
Figure 4: Allowance prices. EUR/tonne CO2e (2004 prices). 2008‒2020  
 
                                                     
9 The projections are based on the low scenario in Climate Cure 2020 (2010b).  
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sThe computed Reference Scenario emissions for the economy as a whole and for the domestic EU 
ETS industries are depicted in Figure 5, along with the global target and the committed emissions cap 
for the EU ETS industries. Over the period as a whole, the domestic GHG emissions increase slightly. 
In 2020 the EU ETS sector emits 45 per cent of the national total, with the largest contributions from 
Petroleum extraction, Manufacture of metals, and Manufacture of industrial chemicals. Among non-
EU ETS sources, Agriculture and households dominate, with own land transport constituting the main 
source of household emissions. 
Figure 5: Reference Scenario emissions (total and in EU ETS sector) and European and global 
caps. Million tonnes CO2e. 2008‒2020 
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As is evident from Figure 5, both the EU ETS and the Kyoto commitments will have to be fulfilled by 
firm’s purchasing of allowances in the EU ETS markets and by the state through flexible mechanisms. 
In 2020, a purchase of 22 million tonnes of CO2e will have to be realised, to which EU ETS firms will 
contribute about a fourth, according to estimates. The overall cost of quota purchases in 2020 is esti-
mated at EUR 340 million.  
3.2 Policy assumptions in Scenarios I, II, and III 
In Scenarios I, II, and III a domestic cap on emissions is imposed. It corresponds to the Norwegian 
government’s domestic emission target announced for 2020 and comes on top of the international 
commitments and aspirations described in the Reference Scenario. We assume that the domestic goal 
for 2020 is approached gradually from the 2008 level; see Figure 6. In 2020, the abatement from the 
Million tonnes CO2ee 
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Reference Scenario within domestic borders corresponds to almost half of the ambition in terms of 
global contributions.  
Figure 6: Reference Scenario emissions, global cap, and domestic cap. Million tonnes CO2e. 
2008‒2020. 
 
  
In order to keep emissions below the cap, an endogenous, uniform price on all GHG emission sources 
is imposed on all GHG emission sources. This substitutes the differentiated CO2 tax system in the 
Reference Scenario. For the EU ETS sources, which still pay the allowance price, the total emission 
price must equal the price in rest of the economy, implying an additional price (tax) on top of the 
allowance price.  
 
In Scenario I, the private risk related to future costs of emissions is neutralised by a legal assurance 
scheme between the private agents undertaking emission reductions and the government. Ismer and 
Neuhoff (2009) sketch an alternative with allowance sales options. An agent undertaking investments 
based on the future price forecast by the government receives sales options for each forthcoming year 
corresponding to the emission reductions he realises. The sales options guarantee that the government 
purchases the allowances at the forecasted price. If the price in a given year falls short of the forecast, 
the agent can buy relatively cheap allowances in the market and use his sales options to earn the 
difference between the market price and the forecasted price. The allowance trading will exactly 
compensate for the costs in excess of the expenditure savings on allowances caused by his abatement 
efforts. If the price reaches the forecasted level, the undertaken abatement efforts are profitable 
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without allowance sales. There will be nothing to earn on the sales options, and they will not be used. 
The idea behind Scenario I is that an assurance scheme similar or equivalent to sales options is 
introduced which compensates perfectly for the political risk component of the domestic emission 
price. The implication is that the agents relate to the announced emission price path and undertake the 
optimal investments. 
 
At the other extreme, Scenario II depicts a situation whereby emissions pricing is not perceived to last 
for more than the current period (year). All upfront investments in climate technologies will, thus, be 
perceived as unprofitable. This regime is implemented by increasing firms’ technological investment 
costs to prohibitive levels. When merely abatement efforts with rather instantaneous emissions effects 
appear worthwhile, firms will choose to reduce variable costs and scale down output, while 
households will substitute consumer goods for energy, and leisure for consumption.  
 
In Scenario III, both downscaling and technological adaptation take place in spite of lack of 
confidence, though the latter is triggered not by emissions pricing, but by upfront subsidies. Contrary 
to announced future carbon prices, investment subsidies paid out immediately are likely to overcome 
the commitment problem, as it will be hard to reclaim investment subsidies paid out in the past (see 
Abrego and Perroni, 2002).  
 
We assume that the upfront subsidies fully compensate for the firms’ technology adaptation costs, as 
suggested in, inter alia, Ulph and Ulph (2013), Conconi and Perroni (2011), and Montero (2011). This 
has two implications. First, it implicitly defines all costs of converting to new technologies as 
investment costs. In practice, the cost structure of climate-friendly technology adaptations varies, as 
does the durability of the capital. Nevertheless, technological adaptations are typically highly capital-
intensive. Second, it ensures that the socially optimal investments will be triggered. Consequently, the 
social costs of the subsidy scheme relate to the marginal costs of public funds only.   
4 Analysis and comparison of the three policy scenarios 
4.1 Scenario I: Guaranteed future emission prices 
Impact on domestic emissions and allowance trading 
To comply with the domestic target, the uniform emission price rises to EUR 164 per tonne CO2eby 
2020. This price is well above all emission prices in the Reference Scenario; see Figure 7.   
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Figure 7: Scenario I and Reference Scenario: Emission prices. EUR/tonne CO2e (2004 prices). 
2008‒2020 
 
 
Petroleum extraction, the remaining EU ETS sector, and land transport are subject to the strictest 
emissions pricing in the Reference Scenario. Thus, compared to the reference, relatively little 
mitigation takes place from these emission sources during the first few years. However, as the 
domestic cap tightens and the associated price increases, gradually more takes place, particularly in 
EU ETS industries. Of the total emission cuts of 9.8 million tonnes CO2e by 2020, 6.2 million tonnes 
are undertaken in the EU ETS sector; see Figure 8.  
 
Reductions are achieved both within already adopted technologies (labelled ‘Non-Tech’ in Figure 8) 
and through investments in new technologies (labelled ‘Tech’ in the same figure). Throughout the 
period, the technological measures account for around 50 per cent of total reductions. While the 
reductions in Process industries are largely obtained by scaling down operations, the lion’s share of 
cuts in other industries and in households are achieved through technological adaptations, primarily in 
the form of novel modes of land transport. 
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Figure 8: Scenario I: Changes in emission from the Reference Scenario, by category. Million 
tonnes CO2e. 2008 ‒2020 
 
Macroeconomic effects 
The social costs, measured as consumer welfare costs, of fulfilling the national target equal a cut in 
welfare of ¼ per cent from the Reference Scenario.
10
 This is equivalent to EUR 25 annually per capita. 
The dominating cost component is the costs associated with the efforts of firms and households to cut 
domestic emissions. The marginal abatement cost of these measures is represented for each year by the 
estimated domestic emission price depicted in Figure 7. On the other hand, several reallocations take 
place that contribute to dampen costs. First, the decline in the need for allowance purchases, particu-
larly for the relatively expensive EU ETS allowances, reduces costs corresponding to about 1/5 of the 
abatement costs. Further, the revenue earnings from the uniform emission price are recycled through 
reduced payroll taxes and thereby yield so-called double dividends (Goulder, 1995). By 2020 the de-
crease in payroll tax rates amounts to 20 per cent. This helps bring about lower wage costs, which are 
shifted on to higher real wages. As a consequence, labour supply rises by 0.5 per cent. Since initial tax 
distortions are considerable in the labour/leisure choice, these adjustments contribute to reduce the 
losses in social efficiency and welfare. Another positive contribution to welfare arises from the climate 
                                                     
10 In the discounting, the yearly consumer utility of the policies is assumed to remain unchanged after 2020 (to infinity).  
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policy’s interaction with existing favourable industrial policy schemes within energy-intensive manu-
facturing. The Process industries contract, and this, in isolation, benefits the economy as a whole, 
because their marginal productivity at the outset is lower than average. Outputs within Manufacture of 
metals and Manufacture of industrial chemicals drop by 22 and 32 per cent, respectively. This releases 
resources for activities with relatively higher macroeconomic marginal returns.  
4.2 Scenario II: Unreliable future emission prices 
Impact on domestic emissions and allowance trading 
In this scenario, absence of reliable emissions pricing signals renders costs of potentially profitable 
upfront investments prohibitive. Given that no action is taken by the government to tackle the 
commitment problem, the uniform emissions price necessary to meet the domestic cap reaches far higher 
levels than under the guarantee scheme in Scenario I. The estimated developments in the national 
emission price in Scenarios I and II are depicted in Figure 4.3. In 2020 the level exceeds 500 EUR/tonne 
of CO2e, which is more than three times higher than in the more cost-effective case of Scenario I.   
Figure 9: Scenarios I and II: Emission prices. EUR/tonne CO2e (2004 prices). 2008‒2020 
  
 
While technological adaptation accounted for over half of the emission reductions in Scenario I, 
almost the entire emission reduction in Scenario II is realised by downscaling emission-intensive 
activities. The simulations reveal that these cuts are far more costly than the technological measures 
they replace.  
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Figure 10 illustrates the change in emissions from the Reference Scenario. As the domestic cap is 
given, total emission reductions are the same as those illustrated under Scenario I in Figure 8. The 
allocation of cuts between the EU ETS and the residual sector also follows broadly the same pattern: 
the residual sector accounts for most of the cuts during the first years, while the share of the EU ETS 
sector increases after 2013 in the wake of the inclusion of more metallurgical industries.  
Figure 10: Scenario II: Changes in emission from the Reference Scenario, by sector. Million 
tonnes CO2e. 2008‒2020. 
 
 
On a more detailed level, however, we can see interesting shifts in the abatement composition. As the 
Petroleum extraction activity level is exogenously given, emission reductions in this sector can only 
be achieved by investing in emission-reducing technologies. Within the EU ETS sector, the exclusion 
of technological opportunities in Scenario II leads to a shift in abatement from Petroleum extraction to 
Manufacture of metals and Manufacture of industrial chemicals; see Figure 11. These process 
industries take more of the burden in Scenario II than in Scenario I, since their production is highly 
cost-elastic due to high export shares and negligible opportunities for cost-shifting within the world 
markets. The activities within the non-EU ETS sector are less elastic. This translates into a lower 
abatement share for the residual sector compared to Scenario I. Service production is more oriented 
towards the home markets, where costs can be passed on to the consumers to a higher degree. 
Typically, Commercial road transportation has little price elasticity. When upfront technology 
investments prove unprofitable because of a high level of perceived uncertainty, less car driving 
hardly compensates in terms of abatement. Coastal and inland water transport does, however, adjust 
more elastically and takes a significantly larger share of the burden. 
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Figure 11: Scenarios I and II: Changes in emission from the Reference Scenario in selected in-
dustries. Million tonnes CO2e. 2020 
 
 
The scope of international allowance trading will be the same as in Scenario I and is determined by 
domestic and global caps. There will be a slight shift towards less, relatively expensive, EU ETS 
purchases in Scenario II, mirroring the increased abatement efforts within the EU ETS sector. 
Macroeconomic effects  
Failure to signal that the climate policy is reliable and enduring renders a welfare loss of about 1 per 
cent compared to the Reference Scenario. This loss is more than four times higher than that faced in 
the case of a guarantee scheme as in Scenario I. Domestic abatement costs explain most of this. 
Replacing socially profitable technological measures with costly contractions of consumption and 
production activities will more than triple the marginal abatement costs, defined by the emission price. 
The increase in total social costs from Scenario I to Scenario II is even larger. As there are numerous 
distortions present in the calibrated model, explanations lay in interaction effects with existing price 
wedges. We see a drastic contraction of Process industries; a fall that brings about social costs to the 
extent that the emissions pricing more than offsets the existing favourable industrial policy schemes. 
Outputs from Manufacture of metals and Manufacture of industrial chemicals drop by 62 and 79 per 
cent, respectively. Commercial road transportation and Coastal and inland water transportation also 
cut services substantially, by 8 and 32 per cent, respectively. Also, use of own cars by households falls 
by 26 per cent, while use of fuels by households decreases by 29 per cent. As there are several indirect 
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taxes besides the CO2 tax imposed on car purchases and fuel use already, their distortive effects will 
increase when transport activities are drastically cut. It must be kept in mind that local beneficial 
effects of reduced transportation, such as reduced emissions and less congestion, are not accounted 
for. However, welfare is also affected by interaction effects working in the opposite direction. The 
abovementioned savings on allowances contribute somewhat. Furthermore, revenue recycling has a 
greater impact in Scenario II than in Scenario I. Payroll tax rates fall by as much as 70 per cent in 2020 
compared to the Reference Scenario, and received wages increase by 1.8 per cent, resulting in a 2-per-
cent rise in labour supply, which is beneficial for the economy. 
4.3 Scenario III: Subsidising technological adaptations 
Impact on domestic emissions and allowance trading 
The domestic and international targets are unchanged from the former two scenarios. The subsidy 
scheme is designed so as to trigger exactly the same climate technology adaptations as in Scenario I, 
i.e. the most cost-effective measures. The composition of non-technological abatement does, however, 
change somewhat compared to Scenario I, as the funding of the subsidy scheme increases the payroll 
tax rates. The result is that abatement shifts away from relatively capital-intensive industries as well as 
from households. These relatively small shifts are evident from Figure 12. The corresponding shift of 
allowance purchases to the EU ETS market is equally small. 
Figure 12: Changes in emission from Scenario I to Scenario III, by industry. Tonnes CO2e. 2020. 
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Macroeconomic effects  
Figure 4.13 shows that the change in payroll tax revenue from Scenario I to Scenario II exceeds the 
subsidy expense. The main reason is that the payroll tax revenue also needs to compensate for a lower 
emission price, which falls by an average of ½ per cent along the path.  
Figure 4.13: The investment subsidy and change in payroll tax expense from Scenario I to Sce-
nario III. EUR million 
 
 
As the subsidy scheme is, by assumption, well targeted at the most cost-effective technology 
measures, the welfare cost compared to Scenario I is caused by the cost of public funds. This is a 
strong assumption, as it requires a rational, fully informed social planner. In practice, subsidy schemes 
can have considerable administration and information costs that are not accounted for in the 
simulations. We discuss such costs in the next section. Besides the abovementioned restructuring of 
the economy towards less labour-intensive activities, reallocation effects of the cost of funding 
through higher payroll tax materialise as lower labour supply. Both these reallocations contribute 
negatively to productivity, GDP, and welfare compared to Scenario I. However, the changes are 
minor. In 2020 we find an increase in aggregate labour costs of 0.1 per cent, a fall in wage rates of 0.2 
per cent, a negative response in labour supply of 0.07 per cent, and reductions in GDP and 
consumption of 0.05 per cent compared to Scenario I. In previous periods the changes are even 
smaller. Another reallocation that implies minor social costs is the shift in allowance purchases from 
the flexible mechanisms to the relatively more expensive EU ETS market.  
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Nevertheless, the simulations reveal an insignificant overall welfare cost from Scenario I to Scenario 
III. The main modifying reallocation taking place results from the lowered GHG emission price. In 
household transportation, where several existing tax interventions interplay, reduced taxation 
contributes positively to welfare and explains the small overall cost of the subsidy scheme.  
5 Final discussion and conclusions 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from our computations. First, our estimates suggest a tripling of 
costs if the government fails to give reliable policy signals that match its announced domestic target. 
The reason is that upfront investment in climate technologies will be hampered. Some lines of policy 
response are suggested, provided the barriers can be attributed to commitment failures. Comparing the 
scenarios with and without technology adaptations also illustrate the shortcomings of a traditional 
CGE analysis compared to our hybrid approach. It reveals that the danger of overestimating abatement 
costs in top-down analyses is sizable and that hybrid approaches are pivotal; note that analogous 
shortcomings apply to bottom-up models, too. 
 
Second, even if technological adaptations fail to be triggered by emissions pricing, a second-best 
subsidy policy could ensure their implementation. Subsidising technological diffusion can be 
politically and practically easier than designing an insurance scheme. A subsidy scheme will increase 
costs, as budgetary transfers will be needed. However, our study finds that the costs of funding these 
transfers are minor. We have not considered administrative costs in our computations, let alone market 
failures and strategic behaviour in the presence of subsidy policies. Additionality problems are well-
known from the literature. Subsidies will not just be claimed by firms that need the subsidy for the 
investment to be profitable, but also by agents who would have invested in the abatement technology 
anyway, without the subsidy. The regulator will therefore require substantial information on 
production costs in order to separate firms that really need the subsidy from those that do not and to 
pick the most cost-effective investment projects. With asymmetric information, improper design of 
subsidies can lead to ineffective incentives and rent-seeking that further increases the social costs. 
(Florax et al., 2011). 
 
Our computations indicate that the implications of technological barriers and investment hold-up are 
most likely severe. Even with conservative estimates, costs seem to be significantly higher for small 
and ambitious countries than those found for the world in Bosetti and Victor (2011). They find an 
additional cost of 76 per cent when they compare a global agreement with no credibility to the first-
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best case.
11
 Our corresponding result for the prosperous and well-organised Norwegian economy 
exceeds 300 per cent. It is reasonable to expect higher costs in our unilateral case, as climate 
consciousness and policies have already inspired climate-friendly economic behaviour, while 
technology is close to state of the art at the outset.  
 
There is reason to emphasize the high uncertainty associated with our computed cost levels. In 
particular, future technological and political opportunities are difficult to predict. Apart from a large 
variety of unsystematic sources of uncertainty, we know that some potential abatement measures are 
ruled out. This applies both to technological options and to compositional changes which by 
assumption are prohibited in the model, such as fixing Petroleum extraction. These omissions 
contribute to increasing abatement costs. On the other hand, transitional costs are unrealistically small, 
particularly given the relatively short time horizon of the analysis. Despite the high uncertainty of the 
cost levels, more confidence can be attached to the welfare ranking of the policy strategies. 
 
                                                     
11 The cost in Bosetti and Victor (2011) is measured as discounted reductions in gross world output, while in this study we 
use discounted welfare; see section 2.2. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1: Production activities in MSG-TECH 
MSG-TECH code Description 
11 Agriculture 
12 Forestry 
13 Fishery  
14 Fish farming 
15 Manufacture of other consumer goods 
18 Manufacture of textiles and apparel 
21 Preserving and processing of fish 
22 Manufacture of meat and dairy 
26 Manufacture of wood and wood products, except furniture 
28 
 
27 
Printing and publishing  
Process industries: 
     Manufacture of chemical and mineral products 
34 
37 
43 
     Manufacture of pulp and paper products  
     a fact re f industrial che icals 
     Manufacture of metals 
40 Petroleum refining 
45 Manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment 
48 Building of ships 
49 Manufacture of oil production platforms 
55 Construction, excluding oil well drilling 
63 Finance and insurance 
65 Ocean transport 
66 Petroleum extraction (including oil and gas, plus pipeline transport)  
68 Oil and gas exploration and drilling 
70 Generation of electricity 
74 Transmission and distribution of electricity 
75 Commercial road transportation 
76 Air transportation 
77 Transportation by railway and tramway 
78 Coastal and inland water transportation 
79 Postal and telecommunication services 
81 Wholesale and retail trading 
83 Dwelling servicing 
85 Other private servicing 
89 Imputed service charges from financial institutions 
 Central government 
92S Defence 
93S Central government, education 
94S Central government, health care and veterinary servicing 
95S Central government, other servicing 
 Local government 
93K Local government education 
94K Local government health care and veterinary servicing 
95K Other local government servicing 
96K Water supply and sanitary servicing 
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Figure A.1: Input factors in the production process 
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Figure A.2 Material consumption 
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